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February 27, 2006
Ms. Lisa Collins
Clerk of the Court of Appeals
Office of the Clerk
450 South State Street, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210
Re: State v. Casper Michael Dunkel, III, No. 20040875-CA
Utah R. App. R. 24(i) Supplemental Authority Letter
Dear Ms. Collins:
Pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State cites State v.
Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, 125 P.3d 938, in support of the State's argument that defendant
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy.
This matter is set for oral argument tomorrow morning, Tuesday, February 28,
2006. The State requests that this letter and the attached decision be distributed to the
Court as supplemental authority.
Sincerely,

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
enclosure
cc: John T. Caine (faxed)

160 EAST 300 SOUTH, SIXTH FLOOR • P.O. 140854 • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
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Appeals' decision for correctness, focusing on
whether that court correctly reviewed the trial
court's decision under the appropriate standard of
review

Nov 22, 2005

[2] Criminal Law €^=>l 134(3)
llOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases
An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision
concerning the constitutionality of a search and
seizure for correctness, applying no
defeience to the tiial court's legal conclusion
U S C A Const Amend 4

Background: Defendant was charged with
possession of controlled substance within 1000 feet
of public structure and possession of drug
paraphernalia The First District Court, Bngham
City Department, Ben H Hadfield, J, denied
defendant's motion to suppress On defendant's
petition for interlocutory appeal, the Court of
Appeals, 81 P 3d 814, reversed

[3] Searches and Seizures €^>195.1
349kl95 1 Most Cited Cases
In those instances where the State defends the
legality of a search based on a theory of
abandonment, the State must establish that the
defendant abandoned her expectation of privacy m
her property by a preponderance of the evidence
U S C A Const Amend 4

Holdings: On grant of State's petition for writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court, Parrish, J , held that
(1) m those instances where the State defends the
legality of a search based on a theory of
abandonment, the State must establish that the
defendant abandoned her expectation of privacy m
her property by a preponderance of the evidence,
and
(2) defendant did not retain any legitimate
expectation of privacy m her van or purse, which
were found by police officei investigating one-car
accident, and thus such items weie abandoned and
could be searched without wan ant
Decision of Court of Appeals reversed, case
lemanded

[4] Abandoned and Lost Property € ^ 1 . 1
lkl 1 Most Cited Cases
Question of abandonment m property law sense is
whether the owner has voluntarily, intentionally,
and unconditionally relinquished his interest in the
property so that another, having acquired
possession, may successfully assert his superior
interests

Supreme Court of Utah
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v
Tanja RYNHART, Defendant and Respondent
No. 20040115.

West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law €=>1011
llOklOll Most Cited Cases
On ceitioran, Supieme Court leviews the Court of

[5] Abandoned and Lost Property €>^>4
lk4 Most Cited Cases
To piove abandonment m the property law context,
one typically must establish it by clear, unequivocal,
and decisive evidence
[6] Searches and Seizures € ^ 2 8
349k28 Most Cited Cases
In the law of seaich and seizuie, the question of
abandonment is whether the defendant has, m
discaidmg the pioperty, relinquished his reasonable
expectation of privacy so that its seizure and search
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is reasonable within the limits of the Fourth
Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[7] Searches and Seizures € ^ 2 8
349k28 Most Cited Cases
[7] Searches and Seizures € ^ 1 6 1
349kl61 Most Cited Cases
The doctrine of abandonment, as applied in search
and seizure contexts, is akin to the issue of standing
because a defendant lacks standing to complain of
an illegal search or seizure of property which has
been abandoned. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[8] Searches and Seizures € ^ 2 8
349k28 Most Cited Cases
Defendant did not retain any legitimate expectation
of privacy in her van or purse, which were found by
police officer investigating one-car accident, and
thus such items were abandoned and could be
searched without warrant; officer was not
confronted with any facts that suggested that
defendant intended to retain her privacy interest in
her purse or van, as defendant did not secure her
vehicle, inform either the property owner or the
police of the accident, or take her purse with her
when she left the scene, but rather left her purse in
the unlocked van for more than five hours,
acknowledging her interest in the property only
after the search had been completed and the van had
been towed to a wrecking yard. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
[9] Searches and Seizures €^>24
349k24 Most Cited Cases
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable and
thus violate the Fourth Amendment unless
undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to
the warrant requirement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[10] Searches and Seizures € ^ 2 8
349k28 Most Cited Cases
A warrantless search or seizure of abandoned
property is not unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment because an individual who has
abandoned her property voluntarily forfeits any
expectation of privacy in that property. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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[11] Searches and Seizures €=>28
349k28 Most Cited Cases
In determining whether the State has established
abandonment of property, thus justifying a
warrantless search and seizure, a court must ask
whether the owner of the property has retained an
expectation of privacy in the object that society
would recognize as objectively reasonable.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[12] Searches and Seizures € ^ 2 8
349k28 Most Cited Cases
Question of whether one has an expectation of
privacy in item for purposes of determining whether
object has been abandoned, thus justifying
warrantless search and seizure, is a question of
intent which may be inferred from words, acts, and
other objective facts. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[13] Searches and Seizures € ^ 2 8
349k28 Most Cited Cases
A property owner need not intend to permanently
relinquish ownership or possession to forfeit a
reasonable expectation of privacy for item to be
considered abandoned, thus justifying warrantless
search and seizure of such
item; rather, she need only leave an item unsecured
in a public place. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[14] Searches and Seizures €^>28
349k28 Most Cited Cases
When determining whether a property owner has an
expectation of privacy in an object or place to be
searched, which is test applied to determine whether
such object or place has been abandoned to justify
warrantless search and seizure, the property owner's
subjective intent is only one of the factors to be
considered; ultimately, the test is whether the
external manifestations of the property owner's
intent would lead a reasonable person to believe
that the property owner had voluntarily abandoned
any legitimate privacy interest in the object or place
to be searched. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
*940 Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Christine Soltis
, Marian Decker, Asst. Att'ys Gen., Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff.
James M. Retallick, Ogden, for defendant.
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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On Ceitioran to the Utah Court of Appeals
PARRISH, Justice
INTRODUCTION
**1 Tanja Rynhart was arrested and charged with
possession of a controlled substance after police
officers discovered a small bag of cocaine in her
purse At the time of the discovery, Rynhart's purse
was in her van, which she had left unattended in a
marsh after driving off the road and crashing
through two fences Rynhait filed a motion to
suppress the cocaine, arguing that the police officer
illegally searched her van m violation of her lights
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution The State argued that the
search was valid because Rynhart had abandoned
her van Alternatively, it relied on the emergency
aid doctrine The district court concluded that the
search was not justified under the doctrine of
abandonment, but nonetheless denied Rynhart's
motion, holdmg that the emergency aid doctrine
applied Rynhart sought interlocutory review of the
district court's order with the court of appeals,
which reversed, holding that the search could not be
upheld under either doctrine Because we conclude
that Rynhart abandoned any reasonable expectation
of privacy m her van and purse, we hold that the
seaich was permissible under the abandonment
doctime Accordingly, we reverse

BACKGROUND
**2 At 8 30 a m on Sunday, January 6, 2002, a
Bngham City police officer was called to the scene
of a single-vehicle accident Upon arriving, the
officer observed that a van, which was then located
m the middle of a privately owned field, had
traveled "over the curb, down an embankment,
[and] through two fences" before coming to rest m
the field Because the tire tracks were covered with
fleshly fallen snow, the officer deduced that the
accident occurred prior to the snowfall, which had
begun appioximately five hours earlier
**3 The officei approached the van and opened a
door to determine whether anyone was still inside
Although the officer did not see anyone in the van,
he did obseive a pmse, a buefcase, and a partially
© 2006 Thomson/West No

consumed bottle of vodka When he opened the
purse, he discovered a wallet containing nearly
$330 in cash, Rynhart's driver's license, and "a
small bag that had a white powdery substance m it "
**4 The officer attempted to reach Rynhart by
phone, but was unsuccessful Thereafter, the owner
of the field in which the van had come to rest spoke
to the officer, requesting the van's removal so that
he could begin to repair the damaged fences
Accordingly, just prior to 10 00 a m , the officer
had the van towed to a wrecking yaid The officer
remained at the scene for a short time thereafter, but
Rynhart did not return At approximately 2 00 p m
that same day, the towing company notified the
officer that Rynhart had arrived to arrange for the
retrieval of her van The officer met Rynhart at the
wrecking yaid and inquired about the small bag
found m her purse Rynhart admitted that the
substance was cocaine She was subsequently
arrested and charged with possession of a controlled
substance, a second *941 degree felony, and
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor
**5 Prior to trial, Rynhart moved to suppress the
evidence seized as a result of the warrantless search
of her van and purse She argued that the search
violated both the United States and Utah
Constitutions because "[t]he officer lacked any
justification to search the vehicle pursuant to any
public safety or warrantless search exception" The
State responded by arguing that the seaich was
constitutional under either one or both of two
theories (1) the abandonment doctrine, and (2) the
emeigency aid doctrine Pursuant to State v Rowe,
806 P2d 730 (Utah CtApp 1991), lev'd on other
pounds, 850 P 2d 427 (Utah 1992), the district
court rejected the State's theory that Rynhart
abandoned hei privacy expectation in the van,
declaimg that "[t]he appaient eaily hour, the winter
conditions, and the single vehicle nature of the
accident all combine to belie the officer's imputing
an intent to abandon the vehicle " The district court
upheld the constitutionality of the search, however,
under the emergency aid doctime
**6 On September 23, 2002, Rynhart filed a
to One; U S Govt Works
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petition for interlocutory appeal, which the court of
appeals granted. The court of appeals reversed the
district court, holding that the emergency aid
doctrine did not apply. State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT
App 410, If 15, 81 P.3d 814. The court of appeals
also held that the search could not be upheld under
the abandonment doctrine, stating that
the State suggests that we should, without the
benefit of a cross-appeal, reverse the [district]
court's ruling that Rynhart had not abandoned her
expectation of privacy in her vehicle. Not only
does the record offer scant support for that
proposition, it offers no support whatsoever that
Rynhart abandoned her expectation of privacy in
her purse and the contents thereof, or her wallet
and the contents thereof.
Id. If 9 n. 3 (emphasis added).
**7 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Thorne
embraced the State's position, concluding that
Rynhart had abandoned any privacy interest she
may have had in the van and the purse when she
"left the vehicle, and its contents, illegally parked
and unsecured for several hours following her
accident." Id. ^ 32. Additionally, Judge Thorne
criticized the rule of law applied by the majority, as
articulated in State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256,
If 14, 76 P.3d 178, and Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736,
which requires the State to prove by "clear,
unequivocal and decisive evidence" that Rynhart
intended to abandon her privacy interest in the
property. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, \ 24 n. 4,
81 P.3d 814. According to Judge Thome, this
"abandonment standard" is flawed and should be
rejected. Id. % 39.
**8 The State petitioned this court for a writ of
certiorari, presenting the question for review as
follows: "Did [Rynhart] retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in her minivan and its
contents when she left the vehicle wrecked and
unlocked on another's property without reporting
the single-car accident to either the police or the
property owner?" We granted the State's petition
and have jurisdiction pursuant to section
78-2-2(3)(a) of the Utah Code. Utah Code Ann §
78-2-2(3)(a) (2002).

© 2006 Thomson/West. No

STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1][2] **9 "On certiorari, we review the court of
appeals' decision for correctness, focusing on
whether that court correctly reviewed the [district]
court's decision under the appropriate standard of
review." Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, \ 8, 116
P.3d 290 (internal quotations omitted). An
appellate court reviews a district court's decision
concerning the constitutionality of a search and
seizure for correctness, applying no deference to the
district court's legal conclusion. See State v.
Markland, 2005 UT 26,ffl[7-9, 112 P.3d 507.
**10 In this case, the court of appeals suggested
that the issue of abandonment was not properly
before it because the State did not file a
cross-appeal. But this court has recognized that
an appellate court may affirm the judgment
appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record, even
though such ground or theory differs from that
stated by the [district] court to be the basis of its
ruling or action, *942 and this is true even though
such ground or theory is not urged or argued on
appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower
court, and was not considered or passed on by the
lower court.
First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002
UT 56, If 11, 52 P.3d 1137. Because the doctrine
of abandonment was apparent on the record and
was, in fact, considered by the district court and
raised in the State's brief to the court of appeals, it
was properly before the court of appeals and is
properly before us.
ANALYSIS
**11 The State identifies two alleged deficiencies
in the court of appeals' analysis. First, the State
asserts that the court of appeals erred when it
required the State to prove abandonment by clear
and convincing evidence. Second, the State argues
that the court of appeals erred when it applied an
abandonment test that focuses solely on a
defendant's subjective intent. We address each
issue in turn.
**12 Before beginning our analysis, we pause to
note that "federal Fourth Amendment protections
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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may differ from those guaranteed our citizens by
our state constitution." Brigham City v. Stuart,
2005 UT 13, H 10, 122 P.3d 506; see also State v.
DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, % 12, 996 P.2d 546 ("While
this court's interpretation of article I, section 14 has
often paralleled the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, we have
stated that we will not hesitate to give the Utah
Constitution a different construction where doing so
will more appropriately protect the rights of this
state's citizens."). But because neither party has
adequately analyzed the state constitutional claim as
an issue separate and distinct from its federal
counterpart, we will not address it. See Stuart,
2005 UT 13, H 14, 122 P.3d 506 ("Because we are
resolute in our refusal to take up constitutional
issues which have not been properly preserved,
framed and briefed, we are once again foreclosed
from undertaking a principled exploration of the
interplay between federal and state protections of
individual rights without the collaboration of the
parties to an appeal." (citations omitted)); Midvale
City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, % 75, 73 P.3d
334 ("Without analysis, the court can make no
informed decision regarding whether the state
constitutional provision in question was intended to
mirror its federal counterpart, or whether it was
intended to expand the scope of First Amendment
guarantees."). Accordingly, our analysis in this
case turns only on federal Fourth Amendment
principles.
I. BURDEN OF PROOF
[3] **13 We first address the State's contention
that the court of appeals erred in applying an
incorrect burden of proof. In its opinion, the court
of appeals cited State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App
256, 76 P.3d 178, as its basis for holding that
Rynhart did not abandon her expectation of privacy.
State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, f 9 n. 3, 81
P.3d 814. In Bissegger, the court of appeals held
that the State must prove abandonment by "clear,
unequivocal and decisive evidence." 2003 UT App
256, 1) 14, 76 P.3d 178 (citation omitted). The
State contends that the court of appeals departed
from traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
by applying that burden of proof We agree.

[4][5] **14 When considering whether
an
individual has abandoned property for puiposes of
the Fourth Amendment, it is "critical" to recognize
the "distinction between abandonment in the
property-law sense and abandonment in the
constitutional sense." City of St. Paul v. Vaughn,
306 Minn. 337, 237 N.W.2d 365, 370 (1975),
quoted in 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
2.6(b), at 671 (4th ed.2004). "In the law of
property, the question ... is whether the owner has
voluntarily,
intentionally,
and
unconditionally
relinquished his interest in the property so that
another,
having
acquired
possession,
may
successfully assert his superior interest." Id. To
prove abandonment in the property law context, one
typically must establish it by clear, unequivocal, and
decisive evidence. See Linscomb v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 199 F.2d 431, 435 (8th Cir.1952)
("Proof of abandonment must be *943 made by the
one asserting it by clear, unequivocal and decisive
evidence.").
[6] **15 Conversely,
[i]n the law of search and seizure, ... the question
is whether the defendant has, in discarding the
property, relinquished his reasonable expectation
of privacy so that its seizure and search is
reasonable within the limits of the Fourth
Amendment. In essence, what is abandoned is
not necessarily the defendant's property, but his
reasonable expectation of privacy therein.
Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d at 371 (emphasis added)
(citations and footnote omitted). And whereas in
the property law context one must prove
abandonment by clear, unequivocal, and decisive
evidence, the burden of proof in the Fourth
Amendment context is much lower.
**16 When addressing the burden of proof to be
applied in search and seizure cases, the United
States Supreme Court has declared that "the
controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings
should impose no greater burden than proof by a
preponderance of the evidence." United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39
L,Ed.2d 242 (1974); see also Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477, 488, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972)
("[W]e are unconvinced that merely emphasizing

© 2006 Thornsc )ii/W« ;st. No CIa iHi to Oris. U.S. Govt. W orks.
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the importance of the values served by exclusionary
rules is itself sufficient demonstration that the
Constitution also requires admissibility to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt [ ]
[N]o substantial
e\idence has accumulated that federal rights have
suffered fiom determining admissibility by a
preponderance of the evidence " (footnote omitted))
**17 We acknowledge that jurisdictions have
disagreed on the appropriate burden of proof to
apply in those cases m which the prosecution raises
abandonment m defending the lawfulness of a
search and seizure Compaie Friedman v United
States 347 F 2d 697, 704 (8th Cir 1965) ("Proof of
abandonment must be made by the one asserting it
by clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence"
(citation omitted)), with United States v Pitts 322
F3d 449, 456 (7th Cir2003) ("To demonstrate
abandonment the government must prove by a
prepondeiance of the evidence that
the defendant
relinquished his property mteiests in the item to be
searched ') We conclude, however, that the
distinction between the concept of abandonment m
property law and in the context of the Fourth
Amendment supports application of the burden of
proof geneially applicable to motions to suppress
Accordingly, m those instances where the State
defends the legality of a search based on a theory of
abandonment, the State must establish that the
defendant abandoned her expectation of privacy m
her property by a preponderance of the evidence
See Lego 404 U S at 488-89, 92 S Ct 619,
Matlock 415 U S at 177 n 14, 94 S Ct 988
[7] **18 We find support for this conclusion in the
fact that the preponderance of the evidence standard
applies in evaluating the standing of an individual
seeking to challenge the validity of a search See
United States v Cantley 130 F 3d 1371, 1377
(10th Cirl997) (The burden was thus on [the
defendant] to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that [he] was peisonally aggneved by the
alleged seaich and seizure because it invaded [his]
subjective expectation of privacy which society is
prepared to lecogmze as reasonable" (some
alterations
m original) (internal
quotations
omitted)) Trie doctrine of abandonment, as applied
m search and seizuie contexts, 'is akin to the issue
© 2006 Thomson/West No

of standing because a defendant lacks standing to
complain of an illegal search or seizure of propeity
which has been abandoned" United States v
Gaizon 119 F 3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir 1997) In
other words, a defendant who has abandoned
particular property has lost any privacy interest in
that property and lacks standing to challenge
searches or seizures of that property The burden of
proof used to evaluate standing should also be
applied in those cases in which the doctrine of
abandonment is asserted as a justification for a
warrantless search and seizure Consequently, to
justify the warrantless search in this case, the State
need only demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that Rynhart abandoned her expectation of
privacy in her van and purse
*944 II THE ABANDONMENT TEST
[8][9] [10] **19 Having identified the level of
proof by which the State must establish
abandonment, we turn to the elements of the
abandonment test The Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated " U S Const
amend IV "Warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable" and thus violate the Fourth
Amendment "unless undertaken pursuant to a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement"
State v Bwwn 853 P 2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992)
But "a warrantless search or seizure of abandoned
property is not unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment" because an individual who has
abandoned her pioperty voluntarily "forfeit[s] any
expectation of privacy" m that property United
States v Tumble 986 F 2d 394, 399 (10th Cir 1993)
(emphasis added)
**20 In this case, the court of appeals lehed on
State v Bisseggei 2003 UT App 256, 76 P 3d 178,
to support its conclusion that 'Rynhart never
'voluntarily relinquished a leasonable expectation of
privacy' and, accoidmgly,
did not abandon her
expectation of pnvacy m her vehicle or m its
contents" State v Rynhait 2003 UT App 410, \
9 n 3, 81 P 3d 814 (quoting Bisseggei 2003 UT
App 256, H 14, 76 P 3d 178) In Bisseggei the
to Oris U S Govt Woiks
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court of appeals lehed on State v Rowe, 806 P 2d
730 (Utah CtAppl991), lev'd on othei grounds,
850 P2d 427 (Utah 1992), m describing the
doctrine of abandonment The Bissegger court
declared
"Determining whether abandonment
occurred is 'primarily a factual question of intent to
voluntarily relinquish a reasonable expectation of
privacy' Thus, the abandonment determination
involves two inquiries (1) whether the individual
lelmquished a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the item, and (2) whether the relinquishment was
voluntary" 2003 UT App 256, f 14, 76 P 3d 178
(quoting Rowe 806 P 2d at 736) Additionally, in
Rowe, the comt of appeals stated that abandonment
"is measured from the vantage point of the
defendant, and not the police It is only the
[defendant's] state of mind that counts " 806 P 2d
at 736 (alteration in original) (internal quotations
and citation omitted)
[11][12][13][14] **21 The State argues that the
court of appeals' formulation of this test constitutes
error We agree The "test of abandonment
subsumes both a subjective and objective
component" United States v Gaizon, 119 F 3d
1446, 1449 (10th Or 1997) Accoidmgly, to
determine whether the State has established
abandonment, a court must ask whether the property
owner has retained an expectation of privacy m the
object that society would recognize as objectively
reasonable See United States v Bwbage 365 F 3d
1174, 1178 (10th Cir2004), ceit denied, 543 U S
993, 125 SCt 510, 160 LEd2d 381 (2004),
United States v Austin 66 F 3d 1115, 1118 (10th
Crr 1995) " 'An expectation of privacy is a
question of intent which may be inferred from
words, acts, and other objective facts f " Austin 66
F 3d at 1118 (quoting United States v Hernandez 1
F3d 944, 947 (10th Cn 1993)) A property owner
need not intend to permanently lelmquish
ownership or possession to forfeit a leasonable
expectation of pnvacy, she need only leave an item
unsecuied m a public place See California v
Gieenwood 486 U S 35, 40, 108 SCt 1625, 100
LEd2d 30 (1988), United States v Barlow 17
F3d 85, 88 (5th Cir 1994) When determining
whether a piopeity ownei has an expectation of
privacy, the pioperty owner's subjective intent is
© 2006 Thomson/West No

only one of the factois to be considered
Ultimately, the test is whether the external
manifestations of the property owner's intent would
lead a reasonable person to believe that the property
owner had voluntarily abandoned any legitimate
privacy interest m the object or place to be searched
**22 Were this a case with disputed facts, we
would remand with instructions that the trier of fact
consider the State's abandonment defense in light of
the legal principles enumerated herem Because the
facts in this case are not m dispute, however, we
will simply proceed with the analysis
**23 Applying the test articulated above, we
conclude that Rynhart had no expectation of privacy
in either her van or her purse We base this
conclusion on the facts available to the searching
officer In this case, the *945 searching officer was
not confronted with any facts suggesting that
Rynhart intended to retain her pnvacy interest in her
purse or van Rynhart did not secure her vehicle,
inform either the property owner or the police of the
accident, or take her purse with her when she left
the scene Instead, she left her purse m the
unlocked van for more than five hours,
acknowledging her interest m the property only
after the search had been completed and the van had
been towed to a wrecking yard Even if Rynhart
had intended to retain an expectation of pnvacy in
her van and purse, we would nevertheless conclude
that she abandoned her property for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment because any such expectation is
not one that society would recognize as objectively
reasonable under the facts presented here By
leaving her van and purse at the scene of an
accident without any indication that she intended to
return, Rynhart rendeied any subjective expectation
of privacy objectively unieasonable We conclude
that Rynhart abandoned her van and purse and,
consequently, foifeited any pnvacy expectation m
those objects Accordingly, the officer's search of
her van and purse did not violate the Fourth
Amendment
CONCLUSION
**24 We hold that the court of appeals ened in
requiring the State to prove abandonment by clear,
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unequivocal, and decisive evidence. The burden of
proof applicable in Fourth Amendment cases in
which the State asserts abandonment is the burden
of proof applied to motions to suppress generally—
preponderance of the evidence. The court of
appeals further erred in focusing solely on Rynhart's
subjective intent. The appropriate test for
determining whether a property owner has
relinquished her expectation of privacy subsumes
both an objective and a subjective component.
Because we conclude that Rynhart did not intend to
retain any expectation of privacy in her purse and
van and that, even if she had, any such intent was
not objectively reasonable, we hold that the court of
appeals erred in suppressing the evidence obtained
through the search of Rynhart's van.
**25 We therefore reverse and remand to the court
of appeals for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
**26 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief
Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant, and Justice
Nehring concur in Justice Parrish's opinion.
125 P.3d 938, 539 Utah Adv. Rep. 63, 2005 UT 84
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